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FOREWORD: LORD CAMDEN MEETS FEDERALISM-USING
STATE CONSTITUTIONS TO COUNTER FEDERAL ABUSES
Akhil Reed Amar*
It is a special treat to be with you today as you resume your
longstanding conversation about state constitutionalism, a conversation for
which this place-Rutgers-Camden School of Law-has justly won renown.
I stress Camden not merely to distinguish this school from its sibling in
Newark, but to remind you of a deep connection between the topic of your
longstanding conversation and your location. What, you may ask, is this
deep connection? Therein lies my tale.
I. CAMDEN: FROM PERSON TO PLACE TO PRINCIPLES
The Rutgers-Camden School of Law, of course, takes its name from the
city in which it sits, but this city in turn takes its name from an eighteenth
century Englishman, Lord Camden. Who was this Camden, and why did
Americans name this city in his honor? Born Charles Pratt, Lord Camden
was a great lawyer, a lover of liberty, and Lord Chief Justice of the Court of
Common Pleas.1 Revolutionary-era Americans adored him, not only because
he championed the American cause in great speeches in the late 1760's, but
also because he decided two great cases in the mid-1760's: Wilkes v. Wood,2
and Entick v. Carrington} Later in my Lecture, I shall have more-much
more-to say about Wilkes and Entick, for I believe that, when closely
examined, the principles underlying these eighteenth century English cases
suggest remarkable libertarian possibilities for twenty-first century American
state constitutionalism.
For now, I simply want to remind you just how central this man,
Camden, and these cases, Wilkes and Entick, were to American patriots in
the 1760's and 1770's. We stand now in one city named by citizens of New
Jersey in honor of Lord Camden, but let us not forget another major city so
* Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale Law School. This Foreword derives from the
Eighth Annual State Constitutional Law Lecture, delivered on February 6, 1996 at the
Rutgers-Camden School of Law. Special thanks to Dan Farber, Alan Tarr, and Bob
Williams for their helpful suggestions.
1. For more on Camden, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill ofRights as a Constitution,
100 YALELJ. 1131,1177 & n.209, and sources cited therein.
2. 19 Howell's State Trials 1153 (C.P. 1763),98 Eng. Rep. 489.
3. 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (C.P. 1765),95 Eng. Rep. 807.
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named, by citizens of South Carolina, or the beautiful seacoast township of
Camden, Maine, whose town seal features a handsome portrait of Lord
Camden. Now, I know I am in Phillies country here-and I admit I am a San
Francisco Giants fan myself-but I am sure that some of you must follow
the Baltimore Orioles, who play their home games in historic Camden
Yards. A couple of hours to the northwest of us stands Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania, named to honor the plaintiff in Wilkes v. Wood. Further south,
we find Wilkes County, Georgia, and Wilkes County, North Carolina, also
named for the plaintiff. If we look for twentieth-century analogues, perhaps
we might think of Wilkes and Entick as the Brown v. Board ofEducation4 of
their day; and Lord Chief Justice Camden as the Earl Warren of his era.
What were these cases all about? In a nutshell, various English critics of
King George m and his ministers published (often anonymous) pamphlets
sharply attacking government policy and policymakers.5 High government
ministers didn't much like these attacks-some things haven't changed-
and so these ministers ordered their henchmen to find out who had authored
these pamphlets so that the authors could be prosecuted and punished for
their audacity and impertinence. In the Wilkes case, the henchmen proceeded
to get a general warrant, which purported to authorize them to search the
homes or the persons of anyone they liked-to round up the usual anti-
government suspects, as it were.6 In the Entick case, the henchmen got a
more narrow warrant, identifying the anti-government publisher John Entick
by name, but purporting to authorize a search of even his most private
personal papers at home.? John Wilkes and John Entick didn't much like
being rousted, and having their homes invaded by government bullies-
again, some things haven't changed-and so they brought civil trespass suits
against the government henchmen, seeking compensatory and punitive
damages for the torts committed upon them. And they won-and won big,
winning impressive damage awards from civil juries presided over by our
Lord Camden.8 .
The structure of these cases was, at least for our purposes here, quite
simple. Plaintiffs sued in tort claiming that these searches and seizures
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. For more background, see TELFoRD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 19-44 (1969); Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of
Papers, 71 VA. L. REv. 869, 875-915 (1985).
6. Wilkes, 19 Howell's State Trials 1153,98 Eng. Rep. 489.
7. Entick, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029,95 Eng. Rep. 807.
8. Wilkes, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1168, 98 Eng. Rep. at 499 (1000 pounds);
Entick, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1036,95 Eng. Rep. at 811 (300 pounds).
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invaded their persons and their property. Defendant government officers, in
tum, pointed to the warrants: "Yes," they in effect conceded, "we did in
some sense trespass upon plaintiffs' persons and property, but the
government authorized us to do so. And government, of course, can often
authorize what would otherwise be an actionable tort. If A reaches into B's
pocket and takes money from B's wallet, that's ordinarily a tort. But if A
does this with governmental authorization, it's okay-it's not trespass, it's
taxes." At this point in the argument, plaintiffs in effect replied that the
warrants were themselves illegal. These warrants violated the unwritten
English Constitution, based on custom, tradition and right reason. No
Parliamentary statute explicitly authorized general warrants-warrants
lacking probable cause under oath, and particular specification of the person
or place to be searched or seized. Similarly, no Parliamentary statutes
authorized warrants for private personal papers, like diaries. Plaintiffs argued
that these broad warrants violated deep English traditions of privacy and
freedom from unreasonable searches.
In his rulings, and his jury instructions, Camden sided with the
plaintiffs. The government warrants were illegal, null and void, not worth
the paper they were printed on. The defendant officials' defense of
government authorization thus collapsed, and they stood as naked tortfeasors
liable for both compensatory damages to make Wilkes and Entick whole,
and punitive damages to teach arrogant government officialdom a lesson,
and to deter similar un-constitutional9 conduct in the future.
Now I hope you can begin to see why Revolutionary-era Americans
loved this pair of cases, and this man. For they, too, often railed against
George Ill's arrogant ministers. They, too, felt that ministerial policy was
violating important traditions of liberty and freedom embodied in an
unwritten English Constitution. They, too, loved juries-for American
patriots were eligible to serve on a local jury, but were ineligible to serve in,
or even vote for, an English Parliament.
How, you might ask, do these cases connect up to the main topics of the
longstanding conversation here at Rutgers-Camden School of Law-
American federalism and state constitutionalism? That is the question I
propose to answer in what remains of this Lecture.
Perhaps the best way to do so is through a series of hypothetical cases
building on the principles underlying Wilkes and Entick.
9. I punctuate this word in this unconventional way to remind us that what was at
issue was an unwritten English Constitution, not an American-style written document.
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II. LORD CAMDEN MEETS FEDERAUSM: STATE REMEDIES FOR FEDERAL
WRONGS
The Fourth Amendment was obviously drafted with Wilkes and Entick
centrally in mind.1O The Amendment's opening clause affirms citizens'
rights to be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures."ll Note how, in singling out persons,
houses, and papers above all other effects, the Amendment focuses precisely
on those aspects of the Wilkes and Entick searches that were so specially
intrusive and, on the facts of those cases, unreasonable. The closing clause
of the Amendment says that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."12 Note that this
Amendment does not, contrary to popular belief, require warrants for all
searches and seizures, or indeed for any search or seizure. Warrants are not
required, but limited: "No Warrants shall issue, but ... .',13 Of course, all
this makes sense if we keep Wilkes and Entick centrally in mind. Warrants
were friends of the government, not of the citizens searched. Warrants issued
by government officials sought to immunize government henchmen from
subsequent review by citizen juries, and so warrants had to be strictly
limited. But if the Amendment doesn't require warrants for all searches and
seizures, what does it require? Simply this: that all searches and seizures be
reasonable.
How was this command to be enforced? Not, as modem courts have
suggested, by the so-called exclusionary rule. Wilkes and Entick were
emphatically not exclusionary rule cases. Indeed, England has never had an
exclusionary rule and no American court for the first hundred years after
Independence ever excluded evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. If
exclusion was not the remedy, what was? Here too, all we have to do is go
back to Wilkes and Entick. If, in the Founding era, the federal government
authorized an outrageous and intrusive search or seizure, the citizen
victimized by this intrusion could sue the federal henchmen who carried out
the search. In this suit, our American citizen-let's call him John Wilkes
Entick-would sue the officers for civil trespass and seek compensatory and
10. For much more documentation and elaboration of the claims in this and the next
paragraph. see generally Akhil Reed Amar. Fourth Amendment First Principles. 107 HARV.
L. REv. 757 (1994) [hereinafter Fourth Amendmentl.
11. U.S.CoNsT.amendIV.
12. [d.
13. [d. (emphasis added).
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punitive damages, just as in England. In turn, government officer defendants
would plead immunity based on the fact that the federal government had
authorized the search or seizure. Then the plaintiff, in turn, would reply that
the purported governmental authorization was null and void, because the
intrusion was, under the Fourth Amendment, unreasonable and thus
unconstitutional. The federal government, John Wilkes Entick would remind
the court, had no power to authorize unconstitutional searches and seizures;
any purported authorization must be ignored, and defendant officers thus
stood exposed as naked tortfeasors.
Thus far, the case of our hypothetical American John Wilkes Entick
seems to look just like the real cases of the English Wilkes and Entick, with
the simple substitution of a written American Constitution for an unwritten
English one. That difference, of course, is an important one. In England,
judges could rule in favor of ordinary citizens and against government
henchmen only in the absence of a clear Parliamentary statute authorizing
the government officers' actions. So long as it acted explicitly, Parliament
could pass laws abrogating the traditional freedoms of Englishmen, and
judges would uphold those laws. In America, by contrast, judges could
disregard even explicit Congressional statutes if such statutes violated the
freedoms of Americans set forth in a written Constitution and Bill of Rights.
Yet, there remains another more subtle, but for our purposes more
important, difference between our hypothetical American case of John
Wilkes Entick and its real-life English forbears. England featured a unitary
legal system, whereas America structured a federal system, dividing legal
authority between state and central governments. Let us now look more
closely at our hypothetical American case to see what happens when the
lessons of Entick and Wilkes take root in American soil-when, in effect,
Lord Camden meets federalism.
In our hypothetical suit, John Wilkes Entick is suing federal officers. In
order to prevail in the end, he must show that these officials violated the
federal Constitution-the Fourth Amendment-and thus lack true
governmental immunity. But what law gets J.W. Entick into court in the first
place? Trespass law, based on property and tort principles typically rooted in
state law. This state law might take any of several forms. It might simply
take shape in common law opinions-and, as Erie14 reminds us, common
law of property and tort is typically state law. These principles might also be
codified in local ordinances, or in state statutes, or in state constitutions.
Whatever their form, these tort and property rules remind us of a dramatic
14. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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but often ignored truth about the Founders' scheme: state law could provide
citizens with remedies againstfederal constitutional violations committed by
federal agents.
To some this fact may come as shock: "That can't be right! What about
the supremacy clause? What about McCulloch?15 What about the Civil
War?" I have elsewhere answered these questions in great depth,16 and so
here I shall be brief. Nothing in the Article VI supremacy clause, or in the
landmark case of McCulloch v. Maryland, or in the spirit of Appomattox and
the Civil War Amendments contradicts the dramatic fact of state law
remedies for federal constitutional wrongs committed by federal agents. The
supremacy clause does not make federal agents supreme, or even
Congressional laws supreme. It makes the Constitution itself supreme. When
federal agents-even when backed by federal law-violate the federal
Constitution, the supremacy clause itself reminds us that these actions are
ultra vires-not "in pursuance of' the Constitution, in the words of the
clause.17 When federal agents search or seize unconstitutionally, the
supremacy clause sides with our J.W. Entick, not against him. So too, in
McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall struck down state interference with a
federal bank that was wholly lawful-necessary and proper under the federal
Constitution.18 Remember how Marshall structured his analysis. First, he
ruled that the bank did indeed fall within the federal government's legitimate
powers. Only after deciding this first question did he tum to the second: may
a state nonetheless tax a federal bank? The clear logic of this overall
structure, and of several specific passages in the opinion,19 suggests that
very different principles would have applied to state law interference with an
unconstitutional federal bank that could not claim bona fide federal
immunity. The Civil War, and the Amendments that followed it, reinforced
15. McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
16. See Akhil Reed Amar, Using State Law To Protect Federal Constitutional Rights:
Some Questions and Answers About Converse-19B3, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 159. 163-72
(1993) [hereinafter. State Law). For an earlier exposition, see Akhil Reed Amar, Of
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE LJ. 1425, 1492-1519 (1987) [hereinafter Of
Sovereignty) .
17. U.S. CaNST. art. VI.
18. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316.
19. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 425-30 (speaking of "constitutional laws of
the Union," "laws made in pursuance of the constitution," "legitimate operations of a
supreme government," and of a federal "right . .. to preserve" the bank) (emphasis added).
See also id. at 427 ("The power of congress to create, and of course, to continue, the bank,
was the subject of the preceding part of this opinion; and is no longer to be considered as
questionable.").
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the supremacy clause and McCulloch, but nowhere freed "the federal
government from limits of the Constitution itself, limits embodied in clauses
like the Fourth Amendment, and in the idea of enumerated power.
Note that in stressing the role of state law in countering federal abuses,
we have not rejected the centrality of federal courts. Although Mr. J.W.
Entick might rely on trespass doctrine laid down by prior state court cases,
his own case might well be tried in a federal court. In a series of removal
statutes adopted in the nineteenth century, Congress provide4 that damage
suits against various categories of federal officers for alleged abuses be
removed before trial from state court to federal district court.20 Even if J.W.
Entick's case were tried in state court, the case would necessarily travel
through federal questions-did the defendants' search or seizure violate the
federal Fourth Amendment?-and thus would trigger the Supreme Court's
appellate review under the celebrated Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of
1789.21 (McCulloch, you will no doubt recall, was precisely that kind of
case; tried in state court, the case raised federal questions - was the federal
bank constitutional? - that triggered Supreme Court appellate review under
section 25.).
In admitting thatfederal judges would rule on the federal Constitution in
the last instance and-if Congress so desired-at trial, too, have we undercut
the importance of state law in cases like J.W. Entick's? Not really. For
federal judges, too, are obliged to enforce relevant substantive state laws,
even in federal question cases. This is required by the Tenth Amendment, by
the famous section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789-the so-called "Rules of
Decision Act"-and by the landmark cases of Green v. Neal's Lessee,22
Murdock v. City ofMemphis,23 and Erie v. Tompkins.24
There is yet another dramatic way that, under the Founders' vision, state
law would help ease and shape the vindication of federal constitutional
rights againstfederal officialdom. If, because of removal statutes, our friend
J.W. Entick were obliged to try his case in federal court, the Seventh
20. See PAULM. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1057-60 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART AND WECHSLER].
21. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73. See generally HART AND WECHSLER,
supra note 20, at 501-21. See also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304
(1816); Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View ofArticle Ill: Separating the Two Tiers of
Federal J.urisdiction, 65 B.U.L. REv. 205 (1985); Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered
Structure ofJudiciary Act of1789,138 U. PA. L. REv. 1499 (1990).
22. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 291 (1832).
23. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
24. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For a thorough discussion of the federalism principles at
work here, see HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 20, at 521-90, 749, 771-91.
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Amendment guaranteed him that his right to a civil jury would be
"preserved."25 Remember that in English cases like Wilkes and Entick, Lord
Camden had not acted alone, but had worked in tandem with juries to
vindicate the rights of Englishmen. In America, the key Fourth Amendment
question turned on the reasonableness of a given search or seizure, and the
Framers expected that civil juries, working alongside judges, would breathe
life into, and give shape to, this broad standard. "Reasonableness" in tort
law, of course, often emerges as an issue of fact, or a mixed issue of law and
fact, in which the jury looms large.26 Beyond its role in helping to determine
liability, a civil jury would also often decide whether to sock defendants
with punitive damages and, if so, where to set the award within a broad
range marked out by judges.27 In short, the Founders saw the ideas
underlying the Fourth and Seventh Amendments as tightly linked together-
a linkage no doubt forged in their minds by the dramatic cases of Wilkes and
Entick. This linkage was perhaps most visible in the Maryland ratifying
convention, where a committee recommended a federal constitutional
amendment requiring civil jury trial in "all cases of trespasses"- plainly
contemplating government officer trespasses-and prohibiting appellate
relitigation of the jury's factual findings.28
We have already noted how, substantively, the trespass law underlying
the Fourth Amendment was state law. Now consider this: procedurally, the
jury law underlying the Seventh Amendment was, perhaps, also intended to
be state law. What did the Seventh Amendment mean when it required
federal courts to '-preserve" the right of civil juries, when this right so
obviously varied from state to state, and within a single state, also varied
over time? Perhaps this: if a state court across the street entertaining a given
common law case would use a civil jury, a federal court hearing the same
case (say, because of removal) must follow-must "preserve"-that state
law jury right. In other words, the Seventh Amendment might be a kind of
Erie-rule for the procedural issue of jury trial, requiring federal courts, at a
minimum, to follow state law jury rules.29 This reading snugly squares with
25. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
26. See Antonin Scalia. The Rule of Law as a Law ofRules, 56 U. em. L. REv. 1175.
1180-86 (1989); Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 10. at 817-819.
27. See generally Alan H. Scheiner, Note, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages,
The Seventh Amendment, and the Politics ofJury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 142 (1991).
28. 2 lim DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENI10NS ON THE AOOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONsnnmON 550 (Jonathan Elliot ed. 1888). For more documentation of the
Fourth Amendment-Seventh Amendment linkage. see Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra
note 10. at 715-78.
29. Federal courts, on this reading, could provide more civil juries than state courts
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the Federalist Number 83, where Alexander Hamilton described various
Anti-Federalist proposals to constitutionalize civil juries as follows: "[Cases]
in the federal courts should be tried by jury, if, in the State where the courts
sat, that mode of trial would obtain in a similar case in the State courts."3O
Although the Supreme Court has never embraced this approach, Hamilton's
understanding draws support from a considerable amount of historical
evidence from the Founding era, which I have set out elsewhere}1
Compared to the Supreme Court's current approach-which can charitably
be called a muddle-the state-law model is rather easy to apply. A federal
court would simply look at the current state law provisions regarding civil
juries-provisions embodied in state court cases, state statutes, and, of
course, state constitutions.
Structurally, once we recall that state law was to provide the substantive
cause of action in trespass suits against overreaching federal officials, it
makes some sense that state law should also be able to guarantee a civil jury.
In the converse situation, the modem Supreme Court has held that in certain
federal lawsuits in state courts, civil juries are part and parcel of the cause of
action and therefore obligatory.32 State law causes of action were at the core
of the Seventh Amendment. For the Founders, the two paradigm Seventh
Amendment cases were state law trespass suits against federal officers, and
diversity cases in contract pitting creditor-state plaintiffs against debtor-state
. defendants. The Seventh Amendment was crafted around these two foci, and
had less bite for causes of action based on federal statutes; a Congress bent
on evading civil juries could draft statutes sounding in equity, not law. The
centrality of state law cases to the Seventh Amendment also explains why its
jury rules were keyed to state practice, whereas the grand jury rules of the
Fifth Amendment, and the criminal jury rules of the Sixth Amendment-
dealing mainly with suits under federal law-were not.
Here too, the notion that state law might playa role in adjudicating
federal constitutional rights against federal officers might come as a shock
to some: ''That can't be right! Surely the federal Constitution does not mean
across the street, but never less. Thus, Congress would be free to prov\.de for a uniform
federal jury rule so long as that rule was at least as protective as the most protective state
jury rule. (Anti-Federalists would obviously have liked this incentive scheme.) We should
also note that prior to 1938, federal procedure often borrowed from state law; and even
today some federal procedural issues are governed by state law, see, e.g., FED. R. avo P.
4(k)(I)(A).
30. THE FEDERAUsT No. 83, at 504 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).
31. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CREATION AND RECONSTRUCIlON OF THE BILL OF
RIGHfS, Chapter Five (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with author).
32. See Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
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one thing in state A and a different thing in state B. Surely it cannot mean
one thing today and a different thing tomorrow. The Constitution lays down
a single rule, for all times and all places."
However, these objections miss a deep and dramatic truth about our
federal system. As Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler proclaimed in a famous
passage in their famous casebook on America's "federal system:"
Federal law is generally interstitial in its nature. It rarely occupies a legal
field completely, totally excluding all participation by the legal systems of
the states . . . Federal legislation . . . builds upon legal relationships
established by the states, altering or supplanting them only so far as
necessary for the special purpose. Congress acts, in short, against the
background of the total corpus juris of the states in much the same way that
a state legislature acts against the background of the common law, assumed
to govern unless changed by legislation.33
Here is an example. Copyright law is distinctively federal law; the
Constitution explicitly empowers Congress to frame nationwide copyright
laws in Article I, Section 8, clause 8. Suppose that Congress legislates that,
when an author dies, his family should be allowed to renew his copyright,
and share in his royalties. But suppose the federal statute does not define
who counts as an author's family. Do illegitimate children count? Adopted
children? Divorced spouses? The Supreme Court has told us that, typically,
gaps like this in federal law are to be filled by state law, incorporated by
reference into a federal scheme.34 Thus, the very same federal copyright
statute would, in its application, vary somewhat from state to state and from
year to year.35
What is true of federal laws passed by Congress is true of the federal
Constitution itself; it too, often incorporates state law by reference, taking on
local hues and molding its shape to fit different and changing state law rules.
To take an easy case, consider the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. It prevents the federal government from taking private
property, for public use, without just compensation.36 But what is property?
Property is often-though admittedly not always-a state law concept, and
33. HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 20, at 533.
34. See id. at 564-67; De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
35. See generally Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness 0/ "Federal Law": Competence
and Discretion in the Choice 0/National and State Rules/or Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv.
797 (1957).
36. U.S. CONST. amend V.
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one that changes over time. Thus, the compensation clause will indeed vary
from state to state and year to year as the state-law tinged concept of
property itself varies.
Indeed, the point gOes even deeper. State law not only helps shape the
very meaning of certain constitutional clauses that build on state law, but it
does so even for constitutional clauses-like the Just Compensation
Clause-that limit federal officers themselves. One of the deepest and most
important functions of state law, and of state constitutions, is to help counter
abuses of federal officialdom.37 This, I fear, is a point that has been lost by
many recent celebrations of federalism and state constitutionalism following
in the tradition of New Jersey's very own Justice Brennan. In Justice
Brennan's famous vision, state judges can use state constitutions to protect
state citizens from abuses perpetrated by state governmental offlcials.38
While his reminder is vitally important, I suggest that it is incomplete. For
example, Brennan's vision nowhere explains why Americans are better off
with federalism than without it. A critic of federalism might say that
federalism merely creates two sets of governments to bully citizens rather
than one. Brennan counters that state constitutions can provide rights against
states, but of course if these potentially abusive states did not exist in the
first place, citizens would not need any state constitutional protections
against them.
Thus, we need to supplement Justice Brennan's vision of federalism
with Publius's vision, which has recently been embraced by the United
States Supreme Court in a series of federalism cases, beginning with
Gregory v. Ashcroft.39 In this vision, states, state laws, and state
constitutions can help protect Americans not merely against state abuses, but
against federal abuses, too. In the words of the Gregory Court:
Perhaps the principle benefit of the federalist system is a check on abuses
of government power .... Just as the separation and independence of the
37. See generally Amar, State Law, supra note 16; Amar, Of Sovereignty, supra note
16.
38. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977). For a discussion and critique, see Amar,
State Law, supra note 16, at 176-78; Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism:
"Converse-1983" In Context, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1229, 1243-46 (1994) [hereinafter Five
Views).
39. 501 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1991). See also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
156, (1992); United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995); id. at 1638 (Kennedy
and O'Connor, JJ., concurring). For a discussion of Gregory's vision, see Amar, Five
Views, supra note 38.
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coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the
accumulation of excessive power in anyone branch, a healthy balance of
power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk
of tyranny and abuse from either front. Alexander Hamilton explained to
the people of New York, perhaps optimistically, that the new federalist
system would suppress completely "the attempts of the government to
establish a tyranny":
[I]n a confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to
be entirely the masters of their own fate. Power being almost
always the rival of power, the general government will at all times
stand ready to check usurpations of the state governments, and these
will have the same disposition towards the general government. The
people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly
make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they can
make use of the other as the instrument of redress.
James Madison made much the same point:
In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is
submitted to the administration of a single government; and the
usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government
into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of
America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided
between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to
each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a
double security arises to the rights of the people. The different
governments will control each other, at the same time that each will
be controlled by itself.4O
Elsewhere, I have tried to trace out in detail the remedial implications
that flow from Alexander Hamilton's argument that "state governments" can
be the "instrument of redress" when Americans' "rights are invaded by" "the
general govemment:>41 Here, I shall say only a few more words on the
matter of state law remedies for federal constitutional rights; then I shall
40. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458-59 (citing THEFEDERAUSTNo. 28, at 180-81 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) and THE FEDERAUST No. 51, at 323 (James
Madison».
41. See Amar, Of Sovereignty, supra note 16, at 1492-1519; Amar, State Law, supra
note 16.
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have a bit more to say about how state law can be seen as shaping not
merely remedies, but federal constitutional rights themselves.
Our Mr. John Wilkes Entick is of course fictional, but in countless
Fourth Amendment cases from the 1790's to the 1970's, real-life Americans
did indeed sue federal officers in trespass, and win. In 1971, the Supreme
Court handed down its landmark decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,42 a decision that made clear that
Americans could sue for damages directly under the Fourth Amendment
itself, without the need to plead a state-law trespass. However, Bivens did
not oust the ancient trespass remedy; it only supplemented it. State-law
trespass is now no longer the only Fourth Amendment game in town, but for
some aggrieved citizens, it might still be the best game in town. For what the
Supreme Court gave with one hand in Bivens, it largely took away with the
other hand in later cases creating zones of immunity for government
officials.43 So far, these federal judge-made immunities have only been used
by the Supreme Court to limit the federal judge-made Bivens remedy: what
the Supreme Court giveth the Supreme Court can taketh away. The Court
has never said that the Constitution requires these immunities- or that these
immunities can lawfully oust state-law remedies that seek to hold federal
officers strictly liable for constitutional violations perpetrated in "good
faith." And because Bivens created a national floor, applicable in all 50
states, federal courts may have strictly limited the quantum of damages for
reasons that would nevertheless permit a given state-law remedy to be more
generous than the federal floor. Thus, even after Bivens a modem-day J.W.
Entick may sometimes prefer state-law remedies to the federal Bivens
variety. To put the point a different way, federal courts may well award a
more generous recovery to a plaintiff with state law on his side than to a
plaintiff without.44
Here is another example. Imagine that our friend J.W. Entick is driving
his car down the highway. With no justification whatsoever, federal officers
pull him over, and start rummaging through his glove compartment. In the
compartment, they find a very personal, private letter written to Entick by
his friend Camden Lord, who also happens to be a passenger in the car. With
no justification whatsoever-just for kicks, and to flex their power-the feds
proceed to read the letter, mocking passenger Lord for some of the more
personal passages. Now suppose that Lord sues under Bivens. Although
42. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
43. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
44. For more discussion of the points highlighted in this paragraph, see Amar, State
Law, supra note 16, at 172-76.
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there are no Supreme Court Bivens cases precisely on point, the Supreme
Court has held, in the exclusionary rule case of Rakos v. Illinois,45 that car
passengers do not have Fourth Amendment standing to challenge car
searches, because they lack a "legitimate expectation of privacy in the
invaded place.'>46 Perhaps, then, by this logic, only owner Entick could
bring a Bivens action, but passenger Lord could not.
But wait. Suppose the car search occurred right here in Camden, New
Jersey, and New Jersey had a legal rule-in Camden city ordinances, or in
state statutes, or in the state Constitution, or in New Jersey case law--that
passengers of cars, or writers of letters "owned" by others do indeed have
privacy and property rights. Might this New Jersey law give our Mr.
Camden Lord "standing" to sue under the Fourth Amendment which he
would otherwise lack? Quite possibly yes. In one passage, the Rakns Court
noted that the passenger in that case had "neither a property nor a possessory
interest in the automobile, nor an interest in the property seized.'047 By
contrast, our Mr. Lord could claim a kind of legal interest in the letter
seized. In another key passage, the Rakas Court noted that:
Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside
of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or
personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and
permitted by society. One of the main rights attaching to property is the
right to exclude others . . . and one who owns or lawfully possesses or
controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of
privacy by virtue of this right to exclude .... [T]he Court has not
altogether abandoned use of property concepts in determining the presence
or absence of the privacy interests protected by that Amendment.48
Precisely because of New Jersey law, Camden Lord would argue, he does
indeed have a Fourth Amendment interest-a legitimate expectation of
privacy-that he might otherwise lack.49
45. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
46. [d. at 143.
47. [d. at 148.
48. [d. at 144 n.12 (emphasis added).
49. As Bob Williams has pointed out to me, the New Jersey Supreme Court has
already begun to do what I am calling for here, bot has pulled up short. See State v. Alston,
88 NJ. 211, 440 A.2d 1311 (1981) (rejecting Rakas and recognizing standing of car
passenger to challenge unreasonable search based on New Jersey state constitutional
provision echoing, but construed more broadly than, the federal Fourth Amendment).
Alston, however, involved state officers and New Jersey judges have hesitated to apply its
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In our last hypothetical, we have shifted gears somewhat. We began with
Mr. John Wilkes Entick in the Founding era, using state law as a remedy for
a (by hypothesis) clear Fourth Amendment violation. But now, with Camden
Lord, we are thinking about using state law to confer standing for a (by
hypothesis) clear Fourth Amendment violation.50 Here, too, we might frame
the issue as one of additional Fourth Amendment ·'remedies." For surely the
car search violated owner Entick's rights. Thus, the argument goes, if state
law could give Entick a more generous recovery than he might get with
Bivens alone, why can't state law do the same thing for Lord?
From another perspective, "standing" could be seen not as an issue of
"remedy" but as one of ·'right:" were Lord's Fourth Amendment rights
violated at all? If not, he has no "right," and thus deserves no "remedy." But
on this view, the lesson of Lord's case is that state law can not only help
remedy a clear Fourth Amendment violation by the feds; it can also help
define a clear violation in the first place. More boldly still: state law can at
times transform what would otherwise be constitutional federal conduct into
unconstitutional federal conduct.
To test this formulation, consider yet another hypothetical case
involving our imaginary friend, Camden Lord. Lord lives in-where else?-
Camden, New Jersey. Every Sunday night he places a dark green trash bag
out on his sidewalk for garbage collection early Monday morning. But Lord
is a vocal opponent of the federal government, and so the feds don't like him
much. Then, with no good justification, the feds decide to harass Lord by
snatching his trash bag early one Monday morning and pawing through it,
hoping to find something embarrassing. Outraged, Lord brings a Bivens suit.
Without more, alas, Lord may well lose. According to the Supreme Court's
opinion in California v. Greenwood,51 a homeowner lacks a legitimate
expectation of privacy in his garbage, once he places it out on the sidewalk
for trash pick-up. To be sure, Greenwood was an exclusionary rule case, and
this may have warped the Court's judgment. Yet the logic of the case leans
logic against federal officers. See, e.g., State v. Mollica, 114 N.J. 329, 352, 554 A.2d 1315,
1327 (1989) (search and seizure case declining to apply state constitutional provision to
limit federal agents: "Stated simply, state constitutions do not control federal action.").
50. See Amar, OfSovereignty, supra note 16. at 1506. 1511 n.337 (state law can often
create legal interests whose violation creates legal injury and thus confers Article m
standing).
51. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
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heavily against Lord, in suggesting that citizens have no Fourth Amendment
right to protect their garbage; no right, no remedy.
But wait. Suppose Camden, New Jersey has a local ordinance explicitly
vesting homeowners with a "privacy" and "property" right in their garbage,
vis-a-vis all the world except local trash collectors themselves, who are
allowed to pick up trash, but are forbidden to search it. Wouldn't this
ordinance itselfhelp to give Lord a legitimate expectation of privacy? By the
same reasoning, a state statute, or a state court case, or a state constitutional
provision could also help to create a legitimate expectation of privacy.52
Thus, state law might indeed help to give Lord a Fourth Amendment right
against federal officialdom that he might otherwise lack.
To be sure, the Court's opinion in Greenwood, in one key, but utterly
thoughtless passage, rejects the relevance of California law to the federal
question at hand.53 Yet it does so in a paragraph that explicitly cites to the
Rakas language that property law is indeed relevant. Earlier in the
Greenwood opinion itself, the Court seems to rely on local law to construe
the Fourth Amendment, by pointing out that trash collectors themselves are
free to search through garbage, or allow the police to do so.54 Even if state
law is not always dispositive on the federal reasonableness of a search,
surely it is relevant to whether a given person's "effects" have been searched
. and to whether that search was "reasonable." So we are left with a sneaking
suspicion that Greenwood in the end may have been driven more by (sound)
doubts about the exclusionary rule than by a proper understanding of Fourth
Amendment reasonableness and the structure of our federal Constitution.
Now take this analysis one last step. Suppose no Camden city ordinance,
or New Jersey statute or New Jersey case or constitutional clause exists. But
suppose that many other states have adopted garbage protection laws. Are
not these state laws, at some point, evidence of a national social
understanding that must inform the meaning of "legitimate expectations of
privacy" under the Fourth Amendment? In a similar fashion, the Supreme
Court has explicitly consulted state death penalty laws as evidence of
52. In fact, a post-Greenwood state court case, construing a state constitutional
provision, does exist in New Jersey. See State v. Hempele, 120 N.J. 182,576 A.2d 793
(1990) (holding that, under the New Jersey Constitution, a person does enjoy a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his curbside trash bag). The Hempele court, however, acted as if
this state law ruling had no bearing on the federal Fourth Amendment. See id. at 191-95,
798-99. I am indebted to Bob Williams for bringing this case to my attention.
53. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 43-44. Unlike our city of Camden hypothetical, however,
California apparently did not purport to vest trash-owners with property and privacy rights
vis-a-vis the world.
54. [d. at 40.
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national social understandings about cruel and unusual punishment within
the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.55 In this tally of state laws, perhaps
state constitutions should count for more than mere state statutes or local
ordinances, as constitutions represent deeper and more considered judgments
of the people themselves. So here, too, we see how state constitutions can
help counter federal abuses.
IV. CONCLUSION
It might seem as if we have had to stretch the teachings of Lord Camden
quite far to make them speak to the topic of state constitutionalism,. but I
doubt that Camden himself would have thought so. So far as I know, Lord
Camden never wrote directly about American federalism, or state
constitutionalism. But he wrote a great deal about the need to use law to
protect liberty and restrain government abuse. And that, of course, has been
one .of the great themes of the longstanding conversation about state
constitutions here at the Rutgers-Camden School of Law-and, I hope, one
of the main themes of my Lecture today.
55. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,369-72 (1989). For a more general
discussion of this and related techniques, see Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial
Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577,590-605 (1993). Note that in Greenwood itself, the Supreme
Court canvassed state appellate court rulings, implying that such rulings were indeed
probative of societal understandings and expectations of privacy. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at
41-43 & n.5.
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